Who was on watch and ultimately responsible: DuPont CEO Edgar S. Woolard (1989 to 1995); DuPont CEO John A. Krol (1995 to 1998); DuPont CEO Charles O. Holliday (1998 to 2009)

In 1991, DuPont drafted a contingency press release in 1991, after it discovered that C8 was present in a landfill near the plant, which it estimated could produce an exit stream containing 100 times its internal maximum safety level. Fears about the possible health consequences were enough to spur the company to rehearse a media strategy. (“What would be the effect of cows drinking water from the … stream?” the agenda from a C8 review meeting that year asked.) 

That same year, DuPont established a “community exposure guideline” for C8 of 1 ppb in drinking water (remember that value).

In 1996, C-8 (PFOA) was detected in drinking water of Parkersburg. Tennant’s animals by the DuPont landfill start dying; Earl Tennant sends videos of foamy water and diseased cows to the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection; state regulators document “numerous deficiencies in the landfill operation and erosion gullies that funnel waste into Dry Run creek; DuPont makes a deal with the department: the company pays a $250,000 fine and the department takes no further action against the landfill. (The official who negotiated the deal later became a DuPont consultant.)

In 1998, 3M reported to the EPA that low levels of fluorochemicals were widely present in humans based on tests of blood-bank samples. 3M determined that ongoing exposure to C8 increased chances of prostrate cancer by 3x. DuPont researchers linked C8 to leukemia.

In 1999, Preliminary results from a monkey study released in 1999 showed that monkeys exposed to C8 lose weight and livers enlarged at the lowest dose; no safe level could be set. Wilbur Tennant’s cows died after drinking water contaminated with C8. DuPont ‘collaborated’ with EPA in which it appointed half the scientists. They didn’t provide the other scientists with information on C8 or notify them that it was in the water. Rob Bilott filed a small suit against DuPont to gain legal discovery.

That same year, DuPont dumped 55,000 pounds of C8 into the Ohio River. Farmer Earl Tenant sued DuPont for poisoning his cows (after they drank from the very C8-polluted stream DuPont employees had worried over in their draft press release eight years earlier); this triggered a class-action suit of Ohio River Valley residents, the truth—after four decades of cover-up—finally began to seep out. 

These are the faces of the DuPont men and women who sanctioned–encouraged–the willful harm of other life to make a profit. Despite knowing the danger posed by exposure to PFOAs of people, these DuPont CEOs chose to: 1) continue to poison the environment and people, 2) cover up their actions from authorities, and 3) fight the courts and regulators from doing the right thing when they were caught. No one went to jail. No one was fired. They just paid $$$ and shamefully kept going. This is NOT good business. This is NOT being a good person. This is gross disrespect for all life and ultimately heinous criminal behaviour deserving more meaningful prosecution than a simple fine.

References:

Fluoride Action Network Pesticide Project. “Timeline for PFOA and PFOS perfluorinated chemicals compiled by FAN’s Pesticide Project” Draft document.

Blake, Marion, Huff Post “Welcome to Beautiful Parkersburg, West Virginia”

Gaber, Nadia, Lisa Bero, and Tracey J. Woodruff. 2023. “The Devil they Knew: Chemical Documents Analysis of Industry Influence on PFAS Science.” Ann Glob Health 89(1): 37.

Halmeriks, Koen and Irina Surdu. 2020. “Dark Waters: what DuPont scandal can teach companies about doing the right thing.” The Conversation.

Kelly, Sharon. 2016. “DuPont’s deadly deceit: The decades-long cover-up behind he “world’s most slippery material.” Salon.

Lerner, Sharon. 2015. “The Teflon Toxin: DuPont and the Chemistry of Deception.” The Intercept.